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The Interaction of Religion and Law
Post-Vatican I Roman Catholic
Perspective
By

JAMES

F.

-

A

BRESNAHAN, S.J.*

SHE TASK of both this symposium on religion and law and
this Article suggesting one contemporary Roman Catholic theological perspective on that issue ought to be understood as
exploratory rather than definitive. This Article, therefore, will offer
one contemporary Roman Catholic perspective from one theological
interpretation of the kind of thinking which led to, was embodied in,
and now derives from the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).' The
aim will be to suggest a way of seeing the religion-law relationship
that allows one to take into account more than the traditional churchstate relationship. The aim will be to evoke the full sociological and
theological complexity of the religion-law relationship, to highlight
the dynamic interaction between diverse human groupings and the
2
developing matrices of ideas associated with them.
a Associate Professor of Christian and Social Ethics, Jesuit School of Theology in
Chicago; A.B. 1947, College of the Holy Cross; M.A., Ph.L. 1953, Weston College;
J.D. 1954 as of 1950; LL.M. 1955, Harvard Law School; S.T.L. 1960, Weston College;
M. Phil. 1968, Ph.D. 1972, Yale University. Member, Council on Religion and Law,
1977-; Elected Fellow, Society for Values in Higher Education, 1975-; Member,
American Society of Christian Ethics, 1965-.
1. THE DOcUMENTS OF VATICAN II (W. Abbott ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Abbott]. For an extensive exposition of traditional church-state themes giving special
attention to the problems of authority, see C. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, VOL. I: THE APOSTOLIC HIERARcrHY (1955).
See also, Church and State, 3

NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 726 (1967); Church and State in the U.S. (Legal History), 3 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 742 (1967).
For a contrasting approach to
the religion-law relationship, see Bresnahan, Theology and Law: a Deeper Understanding of Vocation, 7 CAP. U. L. REv. 25 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Theology and
Law], 2 N.I.C.M. JOURNAL 10 (1977).

2.

The dominant perspective, separating religion and law, has been challenged

by the pioneering essay of Harold Berman, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION

(1974).
[1361]
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The means chosen for achieving this end are theological: to
expose and apply the polar categories, "church" and "world," as these
have been discussed by a German theologian, Karl Rahner, whose
work cleared theological ground for the achievement of Vatican II
and who has continued to exercise an intellectual, though unofficial,
influence on Roman Catholic church polity through his theological
writings. 3 Thus, what follows should not be taken as any more than
one theory among many for interpreting various and often conflicting
practical tendencies developing among American Roman Catholics.
The application of the polar categories, "church" and "world," to the
problem of the interaction of religion and law is not made by Rahner
himself but is the responsibility of the author of this Article alone.
Several caveats are necessary at the beginning. First, although
these categories have a specifically Roman Catholic theological lineage,
they reflect a widespread concern among Christian theologians generally, Protestant and Catholic, to achieve a renewed understanding
of the mutually conditioning relationship between the religious and
secular dimensions of human experience. There is already present
in Christian theology today a functioning ecumenism that is running
well ahead of what might be called official efforts by Church leader4
ship and also what one might characterize as normal parish practice.
Second, these categories imply something interdisciplinary. They are
not merely theological; the interaction between ecclesiastical and
other social groups and the ideas associated with such groups surfaces, more or less explicitly, as the categories are explained." These
categories also manifest lines of continuity with the thinking of
"natural law" in Roman Catholic theology and with conceptions
of the respective realms of moral authority of church and state."
3. See H. VORGRINILER, KARL RAHNER, His LIFE, THOUGHT AND WORKS (1966).
The focus of the theological interpretation that follows will be on Rahner, 1 Sacramentum Mundi, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY, Church and World 346 (1968),

reprinted in

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF THEOLOGY:

TIlE CONCISE SACRAMIENTU-M

MUNDI

237

(Rahner ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Church and World]. For a recent appraisal
of Rahner's influence on both Catholic and Protestant theologians, see Marty, Book
Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1978, Religious Books at 15.
4. An outstanding example of this functioning ecumenism in theology is a work
which implicitly emphasizes a concern for the church-world problematic, D. TRACY.
Blessed Rage for Order, THE NEW PLURALISIM IN THEOLOGY (1975).

5. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE
(1966); P. BERGEn, THE SACRED CANOPY (1969).

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALIT

6. Concerning continuity with "natural law" tradition, see Bresnahan, Rahner',
Christian Ethics, 123 AMERICA 351 (Oct. 31, 1970) and Bresnahan, The Methodology
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These categories also evoke the history of actual historical conflicts
the socio-political ambetween persons and groups which constitute
7
develop.
ideas
such
which
bience within
This Article first will examine the content of the categories,
"church" and "World;" second, it will investigate the polar categories,
"integrism" and "esotericism," which present the normative implications of church and world; and third, it will note novel, contemporary
trends that distinguish the content of such categories from previous
Catholic thinking. Finally, this Article will suggest one example of
the way in which these categories may be used as the basis for interpreting and responding to contemporary problems presented by the
interaction of religion and law.

Church and World:

Categories for a Theological

Interpretation of the Interaction between
Religion and Law
Rahner employs the categories, church and world, to interpret
a new and comprehensive set of themes undergirding Vatican Council
II's statements in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, the Decree on Ecumenism, the Declaration on the
Relationship of the Church to Non-ChristianReligions, and the widely
noticed Declaration on Religious Freedom." In response to Pope
John XXIII's call for "aggiornamento," the Council sought to articulate the self-understanding of the Church today. This effort implied
the recognition of a contrast between past experience along with the
theological language in which that experience was interpreted and
present experience along with the theological language that must be
shaped to accommodate it.
World
From the perspective of Vatican II, Rahner finds new meaning
given to the word, "world":
of "Natural Law" Ethical Reasoning in the Theology of Karl Rahner and Its Supplenentary Development Using the Legal Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University; University Microfilms 72-29520 (1972)).

7. An excellent example of such literature is B. TiERNEY,
1050-1300 (1964).
8. Abbott, supra note 1, at 199, 3362 356, 672.

& STATE

THE CRisis OF CHURCH
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[T]he "world" is envisaged as it is experienced at the present
time - as a history of humanity as a single whole, and as a world
which is not simply an antecedent datum, a situation of interest
solely in the perspective of salvation. It is a world planned and
produced by man himself and it therefore concerns man even in
its own empirically observable importance.
World is creation but, with an explicit reference to human beings and
human societies insofar as they are the special dimension of this creation, conscious and self-disposing. Thus, world in its relationship
to church connotes all presently experienced aspects of the human
earthly reality-the structural, political, social, economic, and cultural.
As it come from God, this created world is good in itself. In
this theologically neutral sense, world refers to material reality as a
unity with regard to origin, destiny, goal, general structures, and the
interdependence of part on part. This neutral connotation of world
evokes the recognition that the whole of creation is the absolutely
necessary reality mediating between God and man; world reveals
God as its author and is the medium for human response to God
through lived action. Natural law tends to focus on world in this
neutral theological sense when it operates within traditional Roman
Catholic theology.1 °
There is also a theologically pejorative sense of the category,
world. It connotes the "calamitous history" of human beings and
human society generally. This additional connotation of world evokes
the recognition that the whole of creation is caught up in and affected
by human rebellion against God and the resulting hostility among
men, women, and social groups. Because in this pejorative sense
world is sinful, and yet remains at the same time good, a conflict with
its own ultimate structures and characteristics is implied. To world
in the pejorative sense, however, Cod has responded with redemptive
self-communication in Christ.
9. Church and World, supra note 3, at 346. For an explanation of Rahner's
understanding of the central importance of "person" as self-conscious and, therefore,
free in the basic sense of being capable of self-disposal (basic self-directing and selfshaping in which the world is shaped by action), see Rahner, The Experiment with
Man, in 9 TIIEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 205 (1972); Rahner, Theology of Freedom,
in 6 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 178 (1969); Rahner, Works, 6 Sacramenturn Mundi,
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY 373 (1970).
10. Bahner elaborates the relationship of nature as creation to the actual historical
economy of salvation which includes sin and redemption. Rahner, The Theology of
Power, in 4 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONs 391 (1966); see Church and World, supra
note 3, at 347-49.
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Yet even as this sinful world it is nevertheless loved by God. It
is in need of redemption but also capable of it, enveloped by
God's grace despite its guilt and in its guilt, and its history will
end in the Kingdom of God. Consequently, despite its opposition to God it constitutes a task for the Christian, who by the
power of grace is to uphold its true order, discern the possibilities
of its development, while critically distinguishing the forces present in it and patiently bearing its burden and darkness which will
never cease until the end. 1
From Ralmer's theological perspective, then, the category, world,
is comprehensive because it seeks to take account of all aspects of
human experience, individual and social, that are dealt with by the
modem human and social sciences. This comprehensiveness, however, has a distinctly theological cast because all of the empirically
available dimensions of creation are viewed in relation to faith and
revelation. An interpretation based upon faith colors the account
of these secular dimensions of human experience. This human world,
in all of its dimensions - from a theological perspective - both good
in itself and fallen but redeemed - is that which contemporary natural law examines from within an explicitly theological perspective.'Church
Thus elaborated, the category, world, implies and stands in dialectical and mutually conditioning relationship with Rahner's meaning
of the category, church. This latter category connotes the individual
and social aspects of the believer, the human being who seeks explicitly to respond to God's self-manifestation and self-communication
and does so always in communion with other believers. Church,
therefore, refers first to the essentially social being of the believer
and second to the empirically observable, socially organized community of believers in all of its dimensions. These structures are
produced by a species of law, which in the Catholic tradition is developed very highly and has had a long and influential history.' 3 This
11. Church and World, supra note 3, at 347.
12. For the conception of a critical or revisionist natural law that functions within
theology, see Theology and Law, supra note 1, and Bresnahan, Rahners Erhics: Critical Natural Law in Relation to Contemporary Ethical Methodology, 56 JOUnNAL OF
RELIcioN 36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rahners Ethics].
13. For a popular discussion of the problems of revising Canon Law after Vatican
Council II so as to reconcile the rich tradition with the contemporary need for restructuring the Church and recapturing a sense of constitutionalism, which lately has
been better developed in political than in ecclesiastical societies, see Hill, Canon Law
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structured community of believers is shaped above all by the shared
belief of its members that their creation in the world is the still incomplete arrival of the Kingdom of God. Grace-empowered obedience
to God makes this ecclesiastical society a "people," but the action of
God's grace in human hearts is believed to take shape not only within
the visibly structured Church but also outside its boundaries in the
world of nonCatholic Christian communities and nonChristian religions. Also, the action of God's grace, even with respect to Church
members in the empirical sense, is understood never to be "solely
in a secret inwardness of conscience, in metahistorical religious subjectivity;" it is always understood that this divine and Christian grace
finds expression "in the concrete fulfillment of an earthly task, of
active love of others."1 4 The category, church, therefore, connotes
both the interpenetration of the believing community with what is
meant by world and also the distinctness but not separability of
church from that world because the faith that grounds this ecclesiastical community must reach outward into secular action.
The theological category, church, cannot be simply identified
either with the sociological definition of religion in functional terms
or with its sociological competitor, the definition of religion in substantive terms. The former definition has given birth to the concept
of a distinctive American civil religion to account for activity in the
secular, especially the political sphere, which has religious elements. I 5
The latter definition has tended to exclude the secular dimensions of
human life from the realm of the religious and to restrict attention
to the extraordinary and the otherworldly in human experience because religion is thought of as a belief and a relationship to the transcendent. 6 Rahner's category, church, precisely in its correlation with
After Vatican II: Renewal or Retreat, AMERICA 298 (Nov. 5, 1977). The problem
of the interaction of religion and law exists within the Roman Catholic Church as a
problem of the theology of law and as a problem of legal practice. For an article that
discusses the latter problem, see Bresnahan, Problems of Marriage and Divorce, A.MERICA
706 (May 25, 1968).
14. Church and World, supra note 3, at 348. For a discussion of the activity of
the Holy Spirit outside of the "visible bounds" of the Church, in ethically good action,
see Rahner, Observations on the Problem of the "Anonymous Christian," in 14 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 280 (1976).
15. See Bellah, Civil Religion in America in RELIGION IN AMERICA 3 (W. McLoughlin and R. Bellah eds. 1968) and in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 21 (R. Richey and
D. Jones ed. 1974). For a basic presentation from the functional perspective, see

T. O'DEA,

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELICION

(1966).

16. For a substantive approach to the sociology of religion, see P. BERGEn, THE
SACRED CANOPY (1969).
Concerning the difference between the functionalist and sub-
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the category, world, underscores in a new way the traditional Catholic
belief that religious faith demands a secular involvement of the believing community and its members. 17 Thus, what is connoted by
the category church is a faith dimension of human living which produces an empirically observable community of believers distinguishable from world and which involves moral effort in every kind of
worldly activity and in every kind of worldly social grouping.
At this point, then, the mutually conditioning dialectical interplay
of the categories leads toward a normative position.' 8 The meaning
of church already involves worldly activity, worldly society, and the
meaning of world already exists within the socially organized church
even while it is the constant object of church's outward moral effort.
Inner-church theology also is influenced constantly by and reacting
to the worldly scientific and cultural disciplines. World philosophy
in all of its forms, systematic as well as popular and unsystematized,
also is being influenced, in varying degrees and in a more or less explicit fashion, by the religious thinking that occurs within church.
These interactions are not only connoted, they become prescribed.
To apply these categories, church and world, in a search for a
deeper grasp of the religion-law relationship means suggesting an interest in more than merely analytic thinking. The categories emphasize the overlap and meshing of religion and law. Hence, they

stantive approaches, see Berger, Second Thoughts on Defining Religion, 13 JOURNAL FOR
The unfortunate bias that a substanTHE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 125 (1974).
tive approach can engender is exemplified in Berger, Secular Theology and the Rejection

of the Supernatural: Reflections on Recent Trends, 38 THEOLOGICAL SruDms 39 (1977).
17. "It follows from . . . the inseparable unity of material and formal morality,
which demands definite, material, and meaningful activities in this world, and cannot
be reduced to a purely religious or formally 'believing' frame of mind. It follows also
from the unity of love of God and love of neighbor." Church and World, supra note
3, at 348. For further development of this active, ethical involvement in the world,
see Rahner, The Function of the Church as a Critic of Society, in 12 THEOLOGICAL INvEsTIGATIONs 229 (1974).
For another illuminating use of Rahner's thinking on this

subject, see D. Hollenbach, A Prophetic Church and the Sacramental Imagination, in
THE FAITH THAT DOES JUsTICE:

CHANGE 234

EXAMINING

THE CHRISTIAN

SOURCES

FOR

SOCIAL

(J. Haughey ed. 1977).

18. There is a movement, therefore, from "description" to "prescription" and from
"is" to "ought," which is characteristic of explicitly natural law thinking. See Rahner's
Ethics, supra note 12. That this movement may be characteristic of any explicitly theological ethics seems likely. See J. GUSTAFSON, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THEOLOGY TO
MEDICAL ETHiCS (1975); J. Gustafson, What is the Normatively Human? in THEOLOGY
AN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 229 (1974).
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encourage synthetic thinking and attention to the inner relatedness
of all distinguishable human phenomena such as religion and law.' 9
Evaluative Implications of the Church-

World

Theological Categories
Rahner develops an evaluative implication in his use of the
church-world theological categories to describe and thereby to comprehend polar interpretations of the religious and secular dimensions
of human experience. He names two inadequate and destructive
tendencies "integrism" and "esotericism." The distinction between
integrism and esotericism functions for Rahner as the means of dealing with the need of the religious realm, church, to respond to the
secular realm, world, as good because created and redeemed, and
also to respond to that world as implicated in human sin. Thus,
church responds to world by committed involvement in world and
at the same time by prophetic criticism of and flight from world. This
response is made the more complex by the inevitable mutual involvement of church and world.
Integrism
Integrism connotes the tendency to overcome tension between
church and world by asserting the triumph of church, especially the
official church, over world.
Integrism regards the world as mere material for the action and
self-manifestation of the Church and wants to integrate the world
into the Church.... It is sufficient to start from the false but widespread tacit assumption that the moral principles of human action
which are defended by the official Church and applied by its
pastoral ministry to men's action are of such a kind that (at least
in principle) in each case a concrete prescription can be deduced
from them for the particular action in question. Then all earthly
action in the history of the world is nothing but the putting into
practice of the principles taught, expounded and applied by the
Church. The activity of the world in State, history and social
life is then simply a realization of the Church's principles, and
in fact an embodiment of the Church itself. The world would
be the corpus Christianum and nothing else.20
19.

See

BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION

16, 138 (1974).

20. Church and World, supra note 3, at 349. For a discussion of the necessity
for the intervention of prudential judgment between abstract moral principles and the
concrete risk of decisionmaking, see Rahner, OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAITH: ELEMENTS
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A full exposition of the theological reasons why Ralmer constructs
this evaluative category is not needed here. It is enough to note
that he specially emphasizes a tacit but false assumption which can
be operative in either official church leaders or ordinary believing
members and which misconceives the meaning of Christian ethics.
Against this assumption Ralmer affirms:
It is not poisible wholly to derive from the principles of the
natural law and the gospel the human action which ought to be
done here and now, although of course all action must respect
those principles. Nor when such action is more than the carrying into effect of those principles and of the official instructions
of the Church, does it cease to be morally important from the
point of view of God and in relation to him as goal. It still concerns salvation and has to be performed with the absolute earnestness of moral responsibility. It can even be the subject of charissecular, a
matic inspiration from on high, and, while remaining
21
factor in the coming of the Kingdom of God.

Ralmer now explicitly recognizes and theoretically articulates
this view by the connotations of the categories, church and world;
contemporary experience permits, indeed demands, that theology
recognize that:
the world is moving from a static condition and a theoretical way
of looking at things to one which can be altered and manipulated
by man and man's action. For then it becomes palpably evident
that the actively created future is no longer wholly to be deduced
from eternal principles but, as something really new and the outcome of active decision, stands under the summons of God and
the responsibility of
man in a way which is not the purely official,
22

ecclesiastical way.

MODERN SPIRITUALrrY 216 (1974); Rahner, The Problem of Genetic Manipulation in 9 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 225 (1972); Rahner, The Position of Woman
OF A

in the New Situation in Which the Church Finds Herself, in 8 THEOLOGICAL INVESTI75 (1971). See also Bresnahan Ethical Theory and Professional Responsibility: Possible Contributions of Religious Ethics to Dialog About Professional Ethics of
Attorneys, 37 THE JURIsT 56, 64-74 (1977).
21. Church and World, supra note 3, at 350. The need for real acceptance in

GAnONS

the church of the function of "unofficial" initiative, especially of lay persons and groups,

has been a consistent theme of Rahner from an early point in his published writings.
See
IN

RAHNEn, THE DYNAmc ELEmENT IN THE CHURCH

(1964);

RAHNm,

FREE SPEECH

THE CMMCH (1959).

22. Church and World, supra note 3, at 350. For further discussion of humanism, hope, and the task of shaping the future as basic to Christian ethical commitment,

see Rahner, The Church's Commission to Bring Salvation and the Humanization of the

World, in 14
Future, in 12

THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
THEOLOGICAL INVESTGATIONS

294 (1976); Rahner, The Question of the
181 (1974).
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This integrism, by collapsing world into church, seeks to obliterate the distinction between them and, as a practical matter, to make
worldly realities such as law merely the expression of churchly policy,
a direct and unmediated expression of religion. As the church-world
distinction is collapsed, so is the religion-law distinction. These irreducibly plural dimensions of human experience are not simply acknowledged to be functionally interrelated within a higher or deeper
unity of living and experience; they are reduced to a flat uniformity,
and that uniformity exists on the relatively superficial level which
resolves any tension between religion and law by making church
dominate and control world.
Esotericism
For Rahner the polar opposite of integrism is esotericism, which
divides church from world and world from Church. Whether in
theory or in practice or in both, the esotericist regards what is secular
as a matter of indifference for Christianity, for a life directed toward
salvation and therefore toward God's absolute future. "The decisive
feature of esotericism is that the secular is abandoned to itself, as an
indifferent or sinful residue in an explicitly religious life which as
far as possible is carried on as exclusively as possible in the small
circle of religious esoterics. It is not regarded as a positive task for
the Christian as such."2 3 Rahner suggests historical precedents for
this esotericist way of solving the tension between church and world
by utterly separating them, precedents which would require separate
24
consideration not possible here.

23. Church and World, supra note 3, at 351.
24. There can be tacit dualisms at work which destroy a distinction between two
dimensions of what is the fundamentally unified reality of human experience by separating what has been distinguished. Catholic and Protestant versions of a one-sided
"doctrine of the invisible Church of the predestined known only to God," have appeared
wherein "what is genuinely moral and valid in God's sight is absolutely metahistorical,
beyond any concrete material determinable action . . . purely a disposition, inwardness (faith, a 'commitment' which remains purely formal in character)." In this view,
"there is no Christian ethics with positive Christian content" but the secular in all of
its dimensions, political, social, economic, and cultural is view as "totally inaccessible
to a Christian attitude, remaining indifferent to this or even simply and solely sinful"
and "stands only under the law, not under the gospel which redeems and sanctifies
the world itself." Most interestingly, Rahner suggests that there can be a strange
amalgam of both esotericism and integrism, "in the tendency, e.g., in the Irish monastic
Church, to make the world a monastery" or in the "Calvinist conception of the theocracy of the Christian community with its Church discipline." Id. at 351.
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By eliminating the functioning interrelationship between the distinct dimensions of church and world, this esotericism would as a
practical matter wholly exclude the influence of religion upon secular
law and of the latter on the former. No undergirding unity would
remain between two dimensions of the one human experience; the
individual and social human reality would simply be fractured by the
intervention of God's revelation and call of His people to flee the

world.

25

Church as Both Commitment to and Flight from World
Ralner's polar categories, integrism and esotericism, are explicitly normative. They are Ralmer's point of departure for recommending a balance, a mean always difficult to achieve, between commitment to and flight from world as the correct and right expression of
church today and depend upon his theological interpretation of the
complex unity of human experience articulated in the church-world
categories. Church must be at the same time both devotedly worldaffirming and prophetically world-denying.2- This evaluative recommendation is directed to both official church leaders and church members who live and work more completely within world. As normative, these polar categories can function to illuminate possible ways
in which Roman Catholics will in fact strive to maintain some form
of balance between the extremes. It can be expected that tendencies
to lean in one direction rather than the other will appear inevitably.
The tension implied between Church and world and between the
poles of integrism and esotericism can be expected to produce various
balances within the contemporary Roman Catholic community as
well as other Christian groups. Before examining the ways in which
these balances might appear as instances of human effort to understand and act upon an understanding of the relationship between
religion and law, however, it is important to take explicit note of
certain distinctively contemporary trends in Roman Catholic thought
that operate in Rahner's theological categories and that place the
content of these categories in a wider context.
Three New Trends in Rahner's Church - World Categories
Theological categories such as church-world are intended by
Ralmer to be theoretical instruments for interpreting concrete human
25. Id. at 350.
26. Id. at 351-55.
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27
experience in the richest and most comprehensive sense of that word.
What is distinctively modern about human experience, therefore, plays
a role in shaping the connotations of these categories and in drawing
normative implications from them through the categories, integrism,
and esotericism. A theologian like Rahner tries to show how the
secular dimension of experience interacts constantly with the religious
dimension of the same experience.

There are at least three distinctively modem or post-modem
trends in Roman Catholic theology adumbrated in the previous discussion of Rahner's theory of church and world. They can be summed up by these phrases: consciousness of historical, evolutionary
development; acceptance of pluralism; and affirmation of the creative
power of human freedom. These interrelated trends are present not
only in Rahner's thought but also in the theories of other influential
Catholic theologians, and they deeply affect the interpretation of
modern experience expressed in the concepts of church-world and
integrism-esotericism.
As quoted above, Rahner's view of contemporary experience of
"world" includes an awareness that human beings today deal with
a world "planned and produced by man himself." He notes that the
Catholic Church deliberately addressed this view at Vatican II in
the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World. Because the church exists in a world of many Christian and non-Christian religions in which the state has a different function from that
in an ideologically homogeneous society, the Council's declarations
on ecumenism, non-Christian religions, and religious freedom may be
justifiably seen as partial answers to the issues of relations between
the Church and the world. Furthermore, Rahner emphasizes that
"marxism" was really the first to work out a genuine theory of a world
to be constructed by man himself in order to escape his own selfalienation."2 8 In Rahner's extensive elaboration of the Council's response to this view, the relationship of Rahner's own views to two
other exponents of the three trends can be discerned.
27. Concerning the role of experience in Rahner's theology, see Carr, Theology
and Experience in the Thought of Karl Rahner, 53 JOURNAL OF RELIGION 359 (1973).
The relationship of experience as Rahner understands it to "experience" as understood
by the American pragmatists is noted in Theology and Law, supra note 1, and in
Rahner's Ethics, supra note 12.
28. Rahner takes note especially of the influence on theological thinking about
the world which results from confrontation between the church and nineteenth century
liberalism and twentieth century Marxism. Church and World, supra note 3, at 346-47.
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First, his emphasis on evolutionary development in human life
and thought sharply contrasts with what he has called an older static
and "excessively cosmocentric" rather than "anthropocentric" theological world view. 29 Rahner's categories reflect the break with what
had seemed to be the prevailing scholastic view among Roman Catho-

lics, one that emphasized static and immutable structures in human
beings and the being of the world to the exclusion of anything but
superficial change. The most striking symbol and exponent of this
newer world view is the French Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard
de Chardin. Teilhard's writings became widely known immediately
before Vatican Council II and have continued since then to provide
inspiration for this new trend in Catholic theology. For Teilhard, the

evolutionary character of human life, human thinking, and human
society formed the undeniable premise for all thought about the world
and humankind. 30 Thus, Rabner's categories, church and world, manifest a generally pervasive new readiness to emphasize the real discontinuities of history even as they continue the traditional Roman
Catholic search to identify more profound continuities that are presupposed by those discontinuities of development from one historical

period and culture to another. The normative recommendation in
the categories, integrism and esotericism, encourages an optimistic
engagement with change. 31

29. "And despite the secular occasions of such growth and change in theory and
practice, this alteration in the Church [its recognition of the relative autonomy of secular sciences and potential variety of the social, political and economic organization of
human groups] is ultimately regulated by the standard of the Church's own spirit and
its own ancient truth.... Changes in the Church and in the world mutually interact.
The change in the Western mind in modern times ultimately sprang from the spirit
of Christianity itself, even though it often rightly or wrongly turned against the actual
existing Church and forced it slowly to learn what it really always knew. That change
led from a Greek cosmocentrism to anthropocentrism, meant destroying the numinous
character of the world and making it the material of human activity. Other aspects
were its rationality and technology, conscious reflection on its own historical character
with a consequent critical relation to the past and openness to a novel future, and the
reduction of human tradition to a merely relative value." Church and World, supra
note 3, at 348-49. See also Rahner, 3 Sacramentum Mundi, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY, Man (Anthropology) 365 (1969), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDrA OF THEOLOGY:
THE CONCISE SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 887 (Rahner ed. 1975).
30. See P. TEILHARD DE CHARDiN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (1965); THE DIVINE
MILIEU (1960); MAN's PLACE IN NATURE: THE HUMAN ZOOLOGICAL GRoUP (1966).
For introduction information, see J.V. KoPP, TEILHARD DE Cfamwn, A NEW SYNTHESIS
OF EvOLUTION (1964).
31. For an example of Teilhard's view of the ethical challenge, see Teilhard, Can
Moral Science Dispense with a Metaphysical Foundation? in TowAu THE FuruRE 130
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Second, Rahner expresses throughout his exposition of the categories, church and world, a concern to deal openly with pluralism.
The interaction of diverse religious and worldly movements, the dialogue between world views deriving from them, are seen as capable
of correcting the inevitable one-sidedness in each, capable of producing more universally human awareness in each. 32 The most influential exponent of this trend in modem Catholic theology is John
Courtney Murray, the Jesuit theologian who so effectively espoused33
the value of "public argument" between "creeds at war intelligibly."
Thus, Rahner's categories, church and world, embody and manifest
the trend in contemporary Roman Catholic theology to take a positive
advantage of pluralism both in church and world. Rahner's normative categories, integrism and esotericism, recommend a confidence
in the possibility and the power of mutually corrective dialogue among
opposed groups of believers and unbelievers and urge a new zeal
for perpetually searching out ever more adequate formulations of
"objective" truth about human beings and the world which is never
exhausted by any one system or theology. There remains, too, a
conviction that the Roman Catholic formulation of truth is relatively
more adequate and thus continues a reverence for the received wisdom of the tradition. However, the wisdom of tradition is now understood as a point of departure for venturesome pilgrimage into the
inexhaustible truth shared also with other world views rather than
as a bastion to be defended against ever threatening encroachments
3 4

of "error."

For Rahner's perspective on change and human effort to achieve it, see
(1975).
Rahner, On the Theology of Revolution, in 14 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 314 (1976);
Rahner, Institution and Freedom, in

13 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

105

(1975);

Rahner, On the Theology of Hope, in 10 THEOLOGICAL IN'ESTIGATIONS 242 (1973).
32. The proper balance between integrism and esotericism requires varying forms
of dialogue, of persuasion by appealing to understanding and consent, rather than the
use of sheer social power, whether on the part of the "official Church" or on the part
of Christians taking individual or group initiative in public life. See Church and
World, supra note 3, at 351-56.
33.
J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AIERFor a new and commendable intellectual biography of
ICAN PROPOSITION (1964).
THEOLOGIAN IN CONFLICT (1976).
Murray, see D. PELOTTE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY:
34.
Recognition of pluralism demands, according to Rahner, a willingness to trust

in the ultimate persuasive power of truth, thus a readiness to appeal to understanding
and consent. The church, both in its official leadership and in its lay membership.
will itself be increasingly "a community Church of those who personally believe by
their own decision. . . . In this way the Church will naturally become a Church of
open dialogue with the world, both within and without. Even within itself, for such
a community Church, despite its abidingly hierarchical constitution, will be a Church
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Third, in Rahner's use of the church-world categories there is
explicit conviction that human freedom has a creative or co-creative
capacity (under grace) to shape world history even as it also shapes
the inner moral quality of the person unto salvation or damnation.
This conviction coheres with beliefs of both Teilhard de Chardin and
Murray. It is human freedom which will effect new actuations of
potentially changeable dimensions of "human nature" (also under
gracel).35 Teilhard's challenge to "build the earth" resonates with
the existence of which is based on the laity as personal believers, and less on the institutional element. ... A laity of that kind, however, by its very nature is the world
(in the legitimate sense) in the Church. That laity's culture, mentality, aspirations,
etc. (even to the extent that they find expression in the Church) are no longer created
solely by the Church as an institution (as was almost entirely the case in earlier times).
They are brought into the Church by the laity as part of the already existing world,
and also by the clergy themselves as men of our time. In that way there is and must
be a dialogue within the Church between Church and world. Outwardly there will
be a similar dialogue because a community Church in the diaspora, which also has to
be a missionary one, may not and cannot shut itself off in itself in a sectarian way.
It must engage openly in dialogue with the world, its civilization, endeavours and creations .... To be able to give, the Church must receive." Church and World, supra
note 3, at 355-56. For further discussion of how a conviction that truth still to be
better achieved undergirds commitment to dialogue in pluralism - rather than skepticism or relativism - see Rahner, Reflections on Dialogue within a Pluralistic Society,
in 6 THEOLOGICAL INVEsIGATIONs 31 (1969); Ralner, Ideology and Christianity, in
6 THEOLOGICAL INVESTGATIONs 43 (1969); 2 Sacramentum Mundi, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THEOLOGY, Dogma 102, 108 (1968), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY:
THE CONCISE SACRAMENTUM MuNDI 360, 366 (Ralner ed. 1975). And see extensive

discussion of this in Bresnahan, The Methodology of "Natural Law" Ethical Reasoning
in the Theology of Karl Rahner and its Supplementary Development Using the Legal
Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller (1972) (unpublished Ph.D.'dissertation, Yale University).
35. It can be argued that Rahner vindicates the position: 1) that there are
changeable dimensions in "human nature"; 2) that there is an unchangeable "core
nature" underlying these; 3) that core nature is most clearly grasped in the tradition
when human consciousness and basic freedom that constitute the human being "person"
are emphasized; and 4) that whether other aspects of the spiritual-material given
makeup of human beings (and societies) are possibly changeable or really unchangeable (because linked in their given reality to core nature in a necessary way) by
"creative" human freedom is a) argued again and again in the light of actual human
moral experience (individual and social), and b) is discovered by the experimental
venture of creative human freedom in moral experience. What can be changed, then,
may in one historical era be creatively changed for the better by the venture of human
freedom. What cannot be changed, however, will be tampered with by human freedom only destructively. For the full argument about how these po!ltions derive from
Rahner's metaphysics and theology, see Theology and Law, supra note 1; Rahner's
Ethics, supra note 12 and Bresnahan, The Methodology of "Natural Law" Ethical
Reasoning in the Theology of Karl Rahner and Its Supplementary Development Using
the Legal Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University).
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this conviction. Murray's arguments for uncoerced faith and for intelligent initiative in favor of the common good echo this conviction,
too. And Rahner's allusion to the Marxist problematic establishes
the continuity of his theology of church-world with developments
in modern papal social teachings upon which Murray commented.3 6
Also, Rahner's allusion to Marxism exemplifies the possibility of directing freedom by learning from the dialogic opponent.
Rahner's theological categories, church and world, thus resonate
with optimism that the experiment of human creative freedom can
and must give witness to and produce both moral dedication to the
world and prophetic correction of its inadequacies. This risky experiment of creative freedom can find better solutions to individual
and social moral dilemmas than have yet been found. Active but
critical freedom may eliminate restrictions on the life of freedom and
may open new opportunities to freedom. This possibility must be
investigated not only in theory but above all through practical com37
mitment.
These three novel trends in contemporary Roman Catholic theology decisively shape the connotations of the church-world categories. Consciousness of the way in which these trends form the
substance of the normative implication in integrism and esotericism
makes the application of this theological perspective to an interpreta36. Murray emphasizes in interpreting Pope John XXIII's encyclical letter Peace
on Earth (Pacem in Terris), published in 1963 less than two months before his death
and after Vatican II had completed its first session, the new importance of freedom
in papal social teaching: "In the past, papal pronouncements on political and social
order have always been suspended, as it were, from three great words - truth, justice
and charity. These three great words are repeated in this encyclical, and the demands
of each are carefully particularized. But a fourth word is added, with an insistence
that is new at the same time that it is traditional. I mean the word freedom. Freedom is a basic principle of political order; it is also the political method. The whole
burden of the encyclical is that the order for which the postmodern world is looking
cannot be an order that is imposed by force, or sustained by coercion, or based on
These
fear - which is the most coercive force that can be brought to bear on man ....
forces of freedom and for freedom emerge from the depths of the human person, which
in the end is the creative force in human affairs." Murray, Things Old and New in
'Pacem in Terris,' AMES CA 612, 613 (April 27, 1963) reprinted as, Key Themes in the
Encyclical, Pacem in Terris, (Peace on Earth) (American Press Pamphlet, 1963).
Analysis would reveal the close connection between these ideas of Murray and Rahner's
understanding of basic freedom and power. See notes 14 & 39 supra.
37. The fundamental importance of the venture of freedom is argued by Rahner
in the essays cited supra notes 20 and 31, and in his recently published FoUtNDATIONS
OF CHRISTIAN FATH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY (1978).
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tion of the interaction of religion and law capable of unveiling implicit religious components in that interaction and, therefore, capable
of opening up new ways of resolving conflict in that interaction.

Interaction of Religion and Law:

Catholic Reaction to

Abortion Decisions
From the Roman Catholic standpoint, a critical challenge to work
out the proper balance between integrism and esotericism is presented by the recent series of United States Supreme Court decisions
on abortion. These decisions began in 1973 with Roe v. Wade8" and
40
Doe v. Bolton8" and continue to the 1977 decisions, Maher v. Roe
and Poelker v. Doe.41 Three typical responses to this challenge can
be identified, described, and interpreted from the reading of Ralmer's
theology of church and world elaborated above. The first response
would be to advocate constitutional amendment, the second to advocate legislative action to restrict fiscal support of abortions, and the
third to advocate finding positive alternatives to abortion. A theological interpretation of these positions from the understanding of
Rahner's categories, integrism and esotericism, manifests the complexity of this instance of interaction between religion and law; it
may lead toward realism about the depth of the challenge even if
it does not produce any ready made and easily applied solution.
In anticipation of a theological interpretation of typical responses,
the line of decisions can be read minimally to represent the following
positions.

First, there exists within the body politic 42 real and sub-

stantial pluralism about the moral character of abortion or at least
about what Catholic moral theology calls the subjective moral culpability of a very substantial number of the persons who obtain abor-

38.
39.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).

40. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
41. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
42. This is not a term of the Court but a category developed by J. Murray to
designate "the people" who are organized under law as "political society" and served
by the "state" which is one subsidiary functional organization having the common good
as its goal. See Murray, The Problem of State Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 155

(1951). Murray's category seems useful to designate the locus of the pluralism about
abortion.
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tions. 43 Second, a constitutional penumbral right of privacy insulates the individual obtaining an abortion and those who assist her
medically from either criminal penalty 44 or its close equivalent. 4 5
Moreover, the claim is denied 46 that the fetus has the constitutional
status of a person and must be protected if necessary by criminal
penalties. Third, discouragement of abortion and preference for
childbirth can constitutionally be made public policy by legal measures denying medicaid funds for abortions.4 7
43. This interpretation supposes that the crucial language in Wade is the following: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Roe v. Wade, 41C
U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
It is "wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and
difficult question" that leads the Court to refuse a construction of the Constitution
"adopting one theory of life." Id. at 160, 162. In fact, the moral dispute can be
about whether abortion is itself, apart from the understanding and consent of particular
moral agents, "objectively" immoral or about whether, the tragic evil of the act of abortion conceded, a significant number of moral agents in this concrete society are able
to understand this and do seek abortions with full freedom, i.e., are "subjectively"
culpable from a moral point of view. For a contemporary discussion of the traditional
Roman Catholic distinction between "objective" and "subjective" morality, see A.
DONAGAN,

THE THEORY OF MORALITY 52 (1977).

44. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton dealt only with criminal penalties against
abortion.
45. The 1976 cases, intervening between Wade and Maher, deal not only with
criminal penalties against abortion but also with restrictions by state action deemed
their close equivalent. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (criminal and other restrictions). Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976),
and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), seem only to deal with procedure after
Maher and Poelker.
46. "All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they arc
today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not include the unborn." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
In some
Roman Catholic quarters, this observation seems to be the only statement of the Court
considered important -

in planning response to it.

47. This position is the thrust of the Maher and Poelker decisions, and it has provoked outrage within the Court and among commentators. See, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 137-46 (1977).
Poelker seems to imply that
legislative and executive actions which discourage abortion (or encourage it) in relation
to child-bearing are inevitable, cannot be controlled except by constant judicial supervision which would, implicitly, involve the Supreme Court in the unacceptable task of
resolving the moral pluralism within the body politic either by deciding that childbirth is constitutionally preferred over abortion or that abortion is constitutionally preferred over child-bearing or that there must constitutionally be equality between them.
The Court seems intent on preserving the neutrality of the Constitution in respect to
this existing moral pluralism and its resolution.
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Roman Catholics are convinced that if done consciously and freely the act of direct abortion as a response to unwanted or even lifethreatening pregnancy is not only objectively, but also subjectively
immoral. 48 At the same time, traditional Catholic moral theology
also takes account of the possibility that there can be subjective inculpability in individuals, especially because of the limitations on
knowledge or freedom that result from hostile social and political
structures. All that has been seen in Rahner's exposition of the categories, church and world, means at least that Catholics cannot regard
this strong moral conviction as a merely private religious matter,
something belonging only to an esoteric religious sect and its internal
policies. The fundamental requirement that church be positively
committed to making efforts toward the betterment of the world in
all of its dimensions demands as a moral exigency of the fundamental
faith commitment that Catholics express prophetic criticism of moral
evil, even when it is merely objective and that they act to reform
those social structures that unjustly restrict the subjective freedom
of individuals and so involve them in objective moral evil. Love of
God, inseparable from love of neighbor, demands some kind of action
to succor these individuals, some effort to effect social change which
will permit or encourage objectively and subjectively good moral
choices. The means chosen become crucial to a theological judgment
about whether official church leaders or lay members can be interpreted to be attempting simply to integrate law under church hegemony. So long as the interpretation remains on this relatively abstract level, labeling of tendencies as integrist or esotericist can remain relatively uncontroversial.
As soon as more concrete approaches are described, however,
the application of the normative polar categories, integrism and esotericism, to the abortion issue as public policy provokes controversy.
There are at least two opposed viewpoints from which the application can be made. One will identify strongly with the three modem
trends in theology which have been interpreted here to shape Rahner's
For a very complete account of the historical background, see J. CONNERY,
AnTHE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE (1977).
other survey of the history also emphasizes the developing rejection of abortion. See
48.

ABORTION:

Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MoRA.,ITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL
HiSTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Noonan ed. 1970). For contemporary convergence

AND

of practical responses by a Protestant and a Catholic to a hard case of abortion, see
Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in id. 101; Harving, A Theological Evaluation, in id. 123.
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own understanding of the categories, church-world and integrismesotericism. The other will implicitly or explicitly recoil from accepting those trends and will either reject outright or give a very
different reading to Rahner's categories.
From the first reading of Rahner's meaning,4 9 a relatively strong
tendency toward what he means by integrism will be detected in the
approach that advocates a constitutional amendment, especially if
this goal is sought only or principally in order to make possible reinstitution of criminal penalties against abortion. Such an approach
seems to have more confidence in coercion and fear as the means
for resolving moral pluralism than in persuasive dialogue between
the opposing parties, thus less confidence in the possibility that dialogue will produce opportunties for creative interventions by which
freedom can effect social development for the better. Of course,
proponents of the constitutional amendment are likely to reject Rabner
or give a different reading to his categories and will challenge this
present application of his thinking as deriving from an implicitly esotericist mentality.
Second, from the reading of Rahner's meaning adopted here,30
a relatively less strong tendency toward integrism will be detected
in advocacy not of constitutional change but of legislative action,
permitted under the present line of Supreme Court decisions, which
would eliminate all public funding for abortion. On first examination, such a position seems to eschew dialogue and social development through consenting freedom's creativity, thus to be still intent
upon coercion, though of a subtler kind than that involved in criminal
sanctions. The position seems to advocate leaving poor persons who
want abortion in severe difficulties but imposing no restrictions on
the wealthy because criminal penalties which would affect all equally have been eliminated by the Supreme Court decisions. However,
this apparent readiness to engage in a subtler kind of integrism, to
bypass efforts for development through dialogue, may in fact be
something rather different. It may in fact imply only a kind of interim toleration of the lesser evil; given the great increase in the
number of abortions after criminal penalties were ruled unconstitu-

49. E.g., the reading here preferred is that which emphasizes the influence of the
three trends in contemporary Catholic theology described above. See notes 27-37
& accompanying text supra.
50. Again, the reading here presented. Id.
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tional and given the continued easy access to Medicaid support, abortion seems to have been made the option legally preferred over bringing pregnancy to term. So interpreted, this approach would appear
less clearly integrist in tendency. At least some of those who espouse
this second approach might, like proponents of constitutional change,
reject Rahner or give him an entirely different reading and brand
this interpretation of their position implicitly esotericist.
Third, from the reading of Ralmer's theology favored here, 5 '
both integrism and esotericism seem best avoided, a balanced interaction of religion and law best achieved, by an approach that emphasizes positive measures to persuade from the abortion option and toward bringing even unwanted pregnancies to term. This approach
would seek to show confidence in the possibility of historical development for the better, in the creative capacity of freedom to effect that
development, and in the probability that sustained dialogue between
opposing groups can be mutually corrective and produce common
advocacy of measures that increase the real options other than abortion. For instance, seeking increased subsidies for prenatal care,
delivery, postnatal care, and adoption and developing other ways of
removing the many economic, social, and emotional penalties that
contemporary American society imposes upon women who bear unwanted children might constitute a program expressing this confidence. 52 Interestingly enough, this approach might also be based
upon the prudential judgment that within a free society only such
positive measures can really save fetal lives and thus really fulfill the
responsibilities of love of God and neighbor in the world in an effective way. This third approach would regard the amendment proposal as tolerable, if at all, only because it might result in a constitutional mandate for these positive measures. If this approach tolerated discriminatory treatment between poor and rich with regard
to use of public money for abortion, it would only be as an interim
measure, reluctantly, because nothing better seems available and the
alternative worse. From a rejection of Rahner or another, different
reading of his categories, of course, this approach will seem hopelessly esotericist.
51. As in Id.
52. An example coming very close to this third approach is to be found in E.
Carroll, M. Dowling, V. Jennings, M. Keenan & C. Moran, Choose Life, A Statement
Affirming the Value of Human Life and Promoting the Quality of Life, (June 1971,
Leadership Conference of Women Religious, Washington, D.C.).
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These two differing interpretations of three prototypical Roman
Catholic responses to the Supreme Court's line of abortion cases illustrate the complexity of the religion-law relationship as it is experienced in concrete interaction between what Rahner means by
church and world. The dynamics of that interaction become more
intelligible, even if a resolution of the tension seems to require a great
deal more dialogue, within the Roman Catholic community and also
between Catholics and those outside the Roman Catholic Church
who simply disagree on the objective moral quality of the individual
abortion decision. Among the topics which ought to be discussed
adequately are the meaning and justification of the three contemporary trends which shape the very content of Rahner's categories,
church and world and their normative correlates, integrism and esotericism. From the interpretation favored here, this discussion may
make possible a mutually corrective understanding of different ways
of experiencing the interaction of religion and law, may result in
modifications of different ways of articulating these experiences, and
so may produce a practical policy tolerable by the opposed positions.
Certainly it can be said that only such dialogue will enable the parties
to appeal effectively to the understanding and consent of others.
Once these theological perspectives of Rahner have been examined and applied, it does seem impossible to doubt that there exists
an unavoidable interaction between religion and law and that every
available means of understanding it must be employed. Even the
most cynical exponent of Realpolitik has to accept and try to cope
with this interaction in all of its complexity as a manifestation of
tension between church and world under penalty of having otherwise
to surrender the desire to make history.

